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EUI WP ECO 2004/261 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the role of regional integration
agreements for growth and convergence, by reviewing some recent contribu-
tions in the ￿eld and, in particular, by relating it to the papers presented
at the 1st Conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and
Trade. The past World Word II era has been characterized by an increasing
international integration of goods markets, with the salient characteristic of
developing countries joining the world economy during the last two decades.
It has being associated also to the development and expansion of regional
integration agreements, covering a larger fraction of international trade. The
move towards free trade is the result of an important change on the views of
both economists and policymakers concerning trade policies, from supporting
import substitution to support export-oriented outward-looking policies.
In the last decade, a huge amount of evidence has been accumulated
showing a signi￿cant correlation between growth and other variables as trade,
openness, quality of institutions, and geography. However, the causal rela-
tions are still controversial and case studies tend to show a huge diversity on
the relation between economic policies oriented to trade openness and eco-
nomic performance. This is particularly true for the relation between regional
integration agreements and growth. The European Union, for example, has
been successful in helping Ireland and South European countries to converge
to the living standards in leading countries. EU acceding countries have
faced high growth rates in the recent years and they expect to converge to
the per capita GDP level of rich European countries in the near future. It is
then important to understand what are the relevant conditions under which
such integration agreement have played the role of a feasible growth strat-
egy, while other regional integration experiences have not. This could be of
a great importance for Latin America, involved in deep processes of regional
integration, as NAFTA and Mercosur, and challenged by the creation of the
FTAA.
2 Integration and growth: The evidence
2.1 Global market integration
There is virtually no dispute over the fact that the international integration
of goods markets has increased steadily during the entire post World War
II era. Figure 1 shows world output and world exports over the last ￿fty
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EUI WP ECO 2004/26Figure 1: Indices of world production and exports (relative to 1950).
years.1 Two things stand out. Firstly, exports have been growing faster than
production. While the index of world production has increased 6-fold, the
index of world exports has been multiplied by 20 in the 1950-2001 period.
Secondly, the evolution was not smooth. We observe two periods during
which global integration increased strongly, 1950-74 and 1986-2001, and one
period of relative stagnation. We now use two di⁄erent indicators of the
degree of global integration to understand what events characterize these
three subintervals.
The world average of total trade ￿ ows (imports and exports) as a share of
GDP, from the Penn World Tables, reveals a pattern that looks quite similar
to the one described in Figure 1.2 In Figure 2, it appears that current and
constant price measures of the trade share move very much in line throughout
the whole time span, with the exception of a major shift which occurred
from 1971 to 1974. This pattern is a direct implication of the oil-price shock
which triggered a sharp increase in the price of tradeable goods relative to
non-tradeables.
Having attributed the jump in the early seventies to the increase in oil
prices, the next question that arises is: what happened around 1985? The
answer is that developing countries have joined the world economy. To illus-
1Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistics, table II.1 ￿World
merchandise exports, production and gross domestic product, 1950-01￿ , available from
www.wto.org. Note: World merchandise production di⁄ers from world GDP in that it
excludes services and construction.
2See Heston et al. (2002). In Figure 2, we use openk and openc variables in the Penn
World Tables mark 6.1. The sample consists of 107 countries that are observed over the
entire time span. While earlier releases of this data (the PWT mark 5.6. for example)
only provided a measure of the share of trade in GDP in current prices, the new data also
provides an index in constant (1996) prices.
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1960 to 1998, cross country averages.
Figure 3: The share of open economies in a total of 101 countries (percentage),
1975-1992. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995).
trate this fact, we use the openness index introduced by Sachs and Warner
(1995), henceforth SW, and updated by Easterly et al. (2003). This in-
dex classi￿es an economy as closed if at least one of the following criteria
is met: (i) a black market premium larger than 20 percent, (ii) the govern-
ment has a purchasing monopoly on a major export crop, (iii) the country
is socialist, (iv) own-imported-weighted average frequency of non-tari⁄ mea-
sures (licenses, prohibitions, and quotas) on capital goods and intermediates
is larger than 40 percent, (v) the own-imported-weighted average tari⁄ on
capital goods and intermediaries is greater than 40 percent.
Figure 3 shows how the fraction of countries classi￿ed as open evolves over
time. This ratio was approximately constant until 1985 and then started to
rise. Strikingly, if one looks at the identity of countries, it turns out that
almost all open countries up to 1985 are the current, as of 2003, OECD
4
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EUI WP ECO 2004/26Figure 4: Share of trade conducted within regional trade agreements.
members. Thus, 1985 marks the entry of developing countries into the world
economy.
2.2 The increasing importance of RIAs
A regional integration agreement (RIA), or regional trade agreement, is an
institutional arrangement, through which two or more countries engage on
some common institutions, involving in particular trade and non trade bar-
riers. It can range from a Free Trade Area, designed to reduce or eliminate
trade barriers among members, to a Monetary Union where independent na-
tions agree on sharing a common currency, on amount of a highly integrated
common market with free mobility of production factors.
Regional integration agreements have steadily become more and more
important in the post World War II era. Figure 4 tracks the share of total
world trade conducted within regional trade agreements since 1958. This
share is increasing for two main reasons. Firstly, the number of regional
trade agreements has being permanently increasing from the seventies, with
an important acceleration at the beginning of the nineties.
Secondly, trade between countries in regional trade agreements has been
growing faster than trade between countries outside such agreements. Ta-
ble 1 below looks at the average growth rate of bilateral trade volumes (in
1996 dollars) of countries that have been part of the same regional trade
agreement. Trade between countries, which did not belong to the same RIA
5
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belonging to the same RIA typically grew at a rate much larger than this.
It is also important to notice in Figure 4 that the share of world trade
conducted within RIAs accelerates around 1985, showing the importance of
RIAs for the globalization phenomenon described in the previous section.
Table 13
Average growth of bilateral trade ￿ ows










Source: IMF Direction of trade statistics
2.3 Openness and growth
There is clear evidence on a positive correlation between growth and trade
shares in cross country studies. However, the existence of a causal link is
under debate, implying that there is no general agreement on the observed
impact on growth of di⁄erent economic policies oriented to trade openness.
Frankel and Romer (1999) support the optimistic view by claiming that in-
creasing the trade share by 1% point, raises GDP per capita by 2.4%.
As stressed by Baldwin (2003), economists and policymakers have changed
their views concerning trade policies from supporting import substitution dur-
ing the 50s and 60s to support export-oriented outward-looking policies from
the 70s. Trade liberalization and openness to foreign direct investment are
among the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. The large in-
crease in trade openness reported in section 2.1, in particular from the middle
of the eighties, is a clear implication of this change in policy recommenda-
tions. But, are policies addressed to open a country to international trade
growth enhancing? As claimed by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), even if trade
liberalization has, on average, robust positive e⁄ects on growth, there is a
3USIS: United States - Israel, CARICOM: Caribbean Common Market, ANZD: Aus-
tralian - New-Zealand Free Trade Agreement, CACM: Central American Common Market.
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reforms. They claim that successful cases are related to trade reforms that
were sustained, i.e., countries continued to deepen trade reform after the time
of liberalization, broad-based, of which trade liberalization was only a part,
and implemented under political stability.
Rodrik (2003b) analyzes the recent growth experiences and takes some
general lessons for growth and development. His conclusions are close to
those by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). In order to understand the clues of
successful economic policies he de￿nes what he calls a growth strategy, i.e.,
￿economic policies and institutional arrangements aimed at achieving eco-
nomic convergence with the living standards prevailing in advanced coun-
tries.￿He claims that growth promoting policies tend to be context speci￿c,
implying that cross-national growth regressions do not provide reliable and
unambiguous evidence. Moreover, from the study of national experiences he
concludes that ￿rst-order economic principles do not map into unique policy
packages. To support this argument, he observes that polices undertaken by
high performing East Asian countries exhibit signi￿cant departures from the
Washington Consensus, at the time that Latin America made the most deter-
mined attempt at remaking itself in the image of it, but reaping little growth
bene￿ts. He points out that a successful growth strategy should be based
on ￿microeconomic policies aim to achieve static and dynamic e¢ ciency in
the allocation of resources. Macroeconomic policies aim for macroeconomic
and ￿nancial stability. Social policies target poverty reduction and social
protection.￿
In particular, concerning trade liberalization, Rodrik claims that it is
good for economic performance only if some side conditions are met. Let me
refer to some of these conditions:
￿ Liberalization must be complete.
￿ If there are some market imperfections, second best policies must be
applied.
￿ The income redistributive e⁄ects should not be judged undesirable by
society at large, otherwise a compensatory scheme must be imple-
mented.
￿ The liberalization must be politically sustainable and credible, so that
agents do not fear a reversal.
Finally, Rodrik stresses the importance of high-quality institutions for
long run growth, a crucial problem for developing countries. As reported
7
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quality of institutions, the degree of integration and geography on one side
and economic growth on the other. Rodrik et al (2002) claim that there is
primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic growth.
2.4 The impact of RIAs on growth
As stated by Venables (2000), the traditional e⁄ects of RIA￿ s membership in-
clude the bene￿ts and costs of trade creation and trade diversion, its impact
on foreign direct investment, and the gains from a large scale and compe-
tition. Venables points out that in a world of market failures, the welfare
e⁄ects of RIAs may be positive or negative, as a direct application of the
second best principle. The global reduction of all trade barriers allow ￿rms
and consumers to buy from the cheapest sources, which is welfare improving.
However, the partial reduction in barriers generated by the creation of a RIA
shifts discrimination between sources of supply, which may divert trade from
a cheap to a more expensive source.
The recent explosion of RIAs has been extensively analyzed over the last
years. Fernandez (1997) classi￿es the main factors behind it in traditional
and non traditional gains from regionalism. The non traditional gains in-
clude political factors and institutions. Regional integration raises reciprocal
trust, contributing to create a peaceful environment. It also avoids the time
inconsistency problems typically associated to unilateral trade liberalization,
which helps improving the conditions for stable institutions. Finally, it works
as an insurance against any form of trade war, which is particularly bene￿cial
for small and poor countries by providing them with a more stable interna-
tional environment. These are the basic arguments in Venables and Winters
(2003) to explain the success of the European Union, as referred below in
section 2.6.
2.5 Currency Unions and growth
In the recent years, a bunch of papers have estimated the impact on trade
and growth of currency unions. Frankel and Rose (2002) claim that currency
unions promote trade, by reducing the costs of international transactions, and
by eliminating the possibility of exchange rate changes between members of
the currency union. In a cross country study, they use a two stage approach to
estimate the impact of currency unions (and currency boards) on trade, and
then through trade on growth. Data on bilateral trade are used to estimate
gravity models. They ￿nd that belonging to a currency union triples trade
with other currency union members, but that sharing both a currency and
8
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evidence of trade diversion. In a second stage, they ￿nd that a one percent
increase in a country￿ s trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita
by at least one-third of a percentage point. Consequently, accession to a
currency union would have a large impact on per-capital income through
trade creation.
Frankel and Romer￿ s results have been criticized for two fundamental
reasons. Firstly, most currency union members in their sample are poor and
small countries. Secondly, estimations are a⁄ected by endogeneity bias: it
may be the case that countries join currency unions constituted by trade
partners. In a more recent paper, using panel data estimators to circum-
vent the possibility of reverse causality in gravity models, Micco et al (2003)
estimate the impact on bilateral trade of European Monetary Union member-
ship. Controlling for European Union membership, they show that a¢ liation
to the EMU has a positive e⁄ect on bilateral trade, even if the estimated ef-
fect is much smaller than the one estimated by Frankel and Rose.4 This
result is particularly interesting, since the EMU is an extreme case of re-
gional integration agreement, which goes far beyond trade policies, and in
many respects ful￿lls the side conditions postulated by Rodrik in order to
trade liberalization be growth enhancing.
2.6 The European experience
The integration process undertaken initially for some few European coun-
tries with the main objective of preventing a future con￿ ict in Europe has
converged in our days to the most successful regional integration agreement
observed during the last century. In a recent paper, Venables and Winters
(2003) stress that the success of the EU is largely based on the following
pillars:
1. In the process of creating the European Union, a deep microeconomic
integration has been built step by step, making it almost impossible to
regress or exit.
2. The establishment of common political institutions (the European Com-
mission and the European Central Bank, among others), playing the
role of the guardians of integration, has been crucial to persist on the
integration process even in the most di¢ cult periods.
4Gravity models are in a large extent supported by economic geography arguments.
Among the variable included are size, measured in terms of GDP or population, distance,
common borders, common language. See Ottaviano and Thisse (2003).
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entails redistributive policies in particular to new acceding countries.
Among the achievements of the EU, I would like to stress its role as a
growth strategy. Ireland, Portugal and Spain reached the status of developed
countries after acceding to the EU. Greece and the new acceding countries
have the same hope. South acceding countries bene￿t from trade creation,
at the time that they import good and stable institutions and pro￿t from
regional redistributive policies. The accession to the EU gives national gov-
ernments the unusual possibility of introducing a large number of reforms
without facing an important social resistance. This is the key role of the so-
called aquis communautaire, complemented by the use of the Structural and
Cohesion Funds. Accession is conditional to a certain number of reforms,
which local government can implement because the national society gives
a high value to membership and European transfer payments facilitate the
use of redistributive policies. More important, these reforms are politically
sustainable, given that the reversal is unlikely. Most of the credibility prob-
lems faced by economic policy in developing countries are counterbalanced
by the prospect of European stable institutions. The Euro is the best exam-
ple. Since the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, the historical experience of
high in￿ ation in some countries does not seem to matter for expectations any
more, allowing national in￿ ation rates to converge to very low values. Finally,
the prospect of convergence in per capita GDP is supported by transfers to
the poor regions, the Structural and Cohesion Funds referred to above.
3 The role of Institutions
There is a large agreement among economists on the existence of a positive re-
lationship between the quality of institutions and the economic performance
of a society. The sense of causality, however, is still controversial. One of
our duties, as economists, is to advice policy makers on the e¢ ciency of both
existing institutions and alternative reforms. The standard analysis we carry
out in order to accomplish this duty is normative. We use economic theory to
evaluate the e¢ ciency of di⁄erent institutional arrangements, and eventually
provide a quantitative evaluation of reforms. When we perform this type
of analysis, we assume that institutions are exogenous and cause economic
performance, and we look for the appropriate formulation of the relevant
economic mechanisms associated to the institutions under evaluation.
However, the ways in which societies decide on their own institutions are
endogenous and highly related to economic performance itself. A positive
10
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mechanisms from growth to institutions needs to be conveniently modeled.
These general principles apply to the evaluation of the relation between
RIAs and growth. From the normative point of view, we are interested in
understanding the impact of di⁄erent integration agreements on economic
performance and growth. From the positive side, we are interested in un-
derstanding the (economic) conditions under which such agreements are a
political equilibrium.
Are RIAs good institutions? What is the optimal design of a RIA? How
do they a⁄ect the economic performance of a society? Under which con-
ditions do we expect countries to decide to become part of a RIA? How
economic conditions a⁄ect the design of RIAs? Gancia (2003) and Kempf
and Rossignole (2003) provide a (partial) answer to these questions. Gancia
does it from the normative side and Kempf and Rossignole from the positive
side.
3.1 The normative role of economic institutions
A good understanding of the normative role of institutions is of a great
importance for economists and policymakers. This principle is particularly
true for the development problem, where the well functioning of economic
institutions is a crucial requirement for growth.
Gancia (2003) is a good example of the joint impact of integration and
institutions on economic growth. His paper focuses on one of the most impor-
tant institutions fostering innovation activities: the protection of intellectual
property rights (hereafter IPR). Under the assumption that South countries
provide in general low protection to IPR, the paper shows that trade open-
ness has two main e⁄ects. Firstly, it shifts technical change in favor of North
countries, since some rents from innovation are lost in Southern industries
due to low protection of IPR. As an implication of this reallocation of eco-
nomic activities, and the associated increase in the relative intensity of R&D
in North countries with respect to South countries, between-country income
inequality may change in favor of North countries. Secondly, trade openness
may reduce growth even in North countries. This result is a direct applica-
tion of the second best principle. The removal of a distortion (trade barriers)
is not necessarily good for growth and welfare in a world where IPR are not
fully protected. The most important normative lesson for regional integra-
tion is that, if market integration goes with protection of IPR, trade bene￿ts
dominate and integration is good for growth.
Gancia￿ s results are based on the following assumptions. Sectorial pro-
ductivity is decomposed in an exogenous country speci￿c term, determining
11
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R&D activities, may be adopted by any country and is subject to IPR pro-
tection. North countries provide full protection to IPR, but South countries
provide partial protection, which a⁄ects negatively patent owners producing
in the South country. The world is Ricardian and North and South countries
specialize in the production of those goods for which they have comparative
advantages.
In his report, Renato Flores makes some interesting suggestions. In par-
ticular, he points out that Gancia￿ s framework may be extended to analyze
the WTO￿ s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs (TRIPS). One of
the two basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement is the national treatment
condition, establishing that foreigner goods must receive the same treatment
as national goods. This principle must be recognized by the local legisla-
tion, which can be easily monitored. However, another important issue of
the TRIPS Agreement is how to deal with enforcement of the local legisla-
tion. Flores suggests to separate legislation from enforcement, by taking into
account that enforcement is costly and di¢ cult to monitor by third parties.
This would help to understand the normative implications of the TRIPS
Agreement.5
The theoretical results in Gancia are consistent with the evidence in Ro-
drik et al (2002) and Easterley and Levine (2002), showing that the corre-
lation between trade and growth disappears after controlling for the quality
of institutions and addressing endogeneity issues. Additionally, Gancia pro-
vides some empirical evidence on a positive e⁄ect on growth of the interaction
between IPR protection and openness.
As a general lesson, we should read Gancia￿ s paper as a defense of the
simultaneous use of trade liberalization and economic reforms that look for
the promotion of good economic institutions. Protection to intellectual prop-
erty rights is a particular case. As an application to North-South RIAs, it
supports the view that trade integration should be followed by a deep in-
tegration process helping South countries to import stable, good economic
institutions from North countries. This is in line with the side conditions
put forward by Rodrik (2003b) and with the pillars of the European Union
described by Venables and Winters (2003).
5Gancia assumes that the degree of protection depends on industry location. Imports
in South countries are fully protected, since they are produced in the North, but exports
to the North countries are partially protected, since they are produced in the South.
Alternatively, the degree of protection may apply to goods consumed in the local market
irrespective of the origin. Under this assumption, the TRIPS Agreement makes sense,
since South countries may protect their own industry by imposing di⁄erent degrees of IPR
protection to national and foreign goods, or by having di⁄erent degrees of enforcement.
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tutional quality has global repercussions (the failure of Southern IPR protec-
tion also reduces Northern growth). Thus, countries should have an incentive
to adopt common institutions, such as in a RIA. These institutions are es-
sentially public goods. Kempf and Rossignole (2003) discuss the political
economy dimension of this issue.
3.2 The political economy of integration
Normative considerations on the welfare gains of RIA membership are not
enough to guarantee that countries actually want to integrate. The process
of creation of the European Union is a good example. The support to new
treaties is voted at the national level, with some well known cases of rejection.
To avoid stagnation in the advance of the integration process, the Union has
followed in some occasions a two-speed strategy, in which some few countries
do not adopt a new treaty. It has been the case of the Maastricht Treaty,
the creation of the European Central Bank and the adoption of the Euro.
The enlargement of the EU faces a similar di¢ culty, as it is the case of
the creation of the Free Trade Area for the Americas. A deep analysis of
the conditions under which countries would like to be part of a RIA is of
fundamental relevance.6
Kempf and Rossignole (2003) analyze the political economy of integra-
tion. In their paper, economic integration yields dynamic bene￿ts, but at
the same time it entails distributional outcomes.7 Consequently, even in a
world where integration is e¢ cient, its impact on the distribution of income
may create national resistance. Kempf and Rossignole also claim that inte-
gration agreements are highly irreversible, implying that when adopted such
an institutional reform is stable.
In an endogenous growth framework with scale e⁄ects, Kempf and Rossig-
nole take the bene￿ts of integration as granted, and analyze the national de-
cisions to integrate in a two country model of the median voter. Technology
is constant returns to scale on capital and labor, and total factor productivity
depends on public goods, giving rise to an endogenous growth model of the
AK type with scale e⁄ects. The government rises income taxes to ￿nance the
production of the public good and the political system decides on the mag-
nitude of the tax rate. Individuals have di⁄erent (initial) non-human wealth,
and consequently di⁄erent preferences on the tax system. Poor agents pre-
6This is related to the recent literature on the number and the size of nations. See
Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
7Kempf and Rossignole (2003) is highly related to the literature on RIAs referred in
section 2.4.
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to produce a high amount of the public good, increasing labor productivity
and wages. In Kempf and Rossignole the world economy is formed by two
countries having the possibility of integrating in a Union if both national
median voters agree on it. Integration has three e⁄ects on the welfare of the
national median voters. The ￿rst, the e¢ ciency e⁄ect, is strictly positive
since integration has a positive scale e⁄ect. The second is called the status
e⁄ect. Integration may remove the key policy-making position of the na-
tional median voter, which is unambiguously costly for him. The last is the
position e⁄ect, which is related to the change in the median voter￿ s position
on the income distribution, in particular with respect to the Union￿ s median
voter. This last e⁄ect is ambiguous. Consequently, it may be the case that
both national median voters do not agree simultaneously on the creation of
a Union, which basically depends on the relative size of countries, on how
unequal countries are in terms of initial wealth and on how unequal national
median voters are.
Pablo Sanguinetti, in his comments, pointed out that the proposed model
applies mainly to problems of regional economic integration, where e¢ ciency
gains are the result of lower tari⁄s and extended markets, and redistribu-
tive costs are associated to changes in sectorial rents and relative wages.
In particular, this theory has some predictions for North-South integration
agreements: gains are potentially large for South countries, but relatively
small for North countries. In the recent history of the European Union,
where most countries voted in referenda whether to support the Maastricht
Treaty, major resistance came from rich (North) countries.
A key open question is why the European Union is still interested in en-
largement, in particular to the East. The core countries have created the
union to render a new war impossible, but they are still promoting enlarge-
ment. Are scale e⁄ects from enlargement large enough for rich European
countries promote it? On the other side, it seems clear that Eastern Euro-
pean countries are highly interested in acceding, because they expect major
gains from converging to the level of welfare in most rich European countries.
Di⁄erences in wealth with respect to the average EU member are so large
that the position e⁄ect should be positive and combined with the e¢ cient
e⁄ect they should dominate the status e⁄ect. Similar questions can be raised
concerning the creation of the FTAA, taking into account the large asymme-
try between the rich and large US and the highly heterogeneous, relatively
poor Latin American countries.
14
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In the process of economic integration of independent nations, geography
plays a crucial role. Most integration agreements are geographically based,
since the interaction of economic activities across national borders tends to
be as important as within national borders when countries are relatively open
to trade. Over Europe, there are many examples of economic regions overlap-
ping two or more nations. The increasing economic importance of Mexican
regions in the US borders, after the signature of NAFTA, is another example.
Moreover, one of the main consequences of RIAs is that economic activities
shift national borders and are reorganized after the signature of the integra-
tion agreement. As pointed out by Venables and Winters (2003), one of the
pillars of the European Union is the achievement of a deep microeconomic
integration. This is based on a simultaneous process of agglomeration and
decentralization of sectorial activities with an important increase in both in-
tersectorial and intrasectorial trade. For these reasons, the analysis of RIAs
is highly related to the new developments in economic geography.
Ottaviano and Thisse (2003) is an original survey of the recent litera-
ture on the so-called New Economic Geography (hereafter NEG), connecting
elements of trade theory with the theory of location. The aim being to un-
derstand what are the economic forces that emerge as the outcome of human
being￿ s actions (the second nature) to improve upon the physical character-
istics of di⁄erent geographical sites (the ￿rst nature). Based on the spatial
Impossibility Theorem, establishing that in a spatial economy there is no com-
petitive equilibrium involving transportation, the NEG studies the e⁄ects of
location externalities and market imperfections on the location of economic
activities. In a general equilibrium framework with market failures, the NEG
analyzes the interplay between agglomeration and dispersion of economic
activities across the space. As an implication of the spatial impossibility
theorem, non-trivial allocations of economic activities across the space are
ine¢ cient, giving place to public intervention. The design of second-best
regional policies requires a good understanding of the main economic forces
behind agglomeration and dispersion. This is of a great importance for the
analysis of regional integration.
Agglomeration of economic activities is at the heart of the NEG. The
home market e⁄ect, according to Helpman and Krugman (1985), establishes
that imperfectly competitive industries tend to concentrate their production
in large markets and export to small markets, once transportation costs are
taken into account. This is the gravitation force behind the gravity model
extendedly used in the empirical trade literature, as in Frankel and Romer
(1999), where bilateral trade is explained by the size and the distance between
15
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factor and workers spend their income in the region they work, predicts
a stronger agglomeration of economic activities. The mobility of workers
multiplies the initial advantage of large markets, amplifying the home market
e⁄ect.
Finally, Ottaviano and Thisse propose two alternative models to under-
stand the bell-shaped curve of spatial development: in the time evolution
of the spatial distribution of population and industries ￿the emergence of a
core-periphery structure would be followed by a phase involving interregional
convergence.￿In particular, they argue that heterogeneous preferences on the
attachment of workers to the local region may predict a bell-shaped relation
between agglomeration and transportation costs. In their theoretical model,
Madariaga et al (2003) has a similar prediction, but starting from a di⁄erent
assumption. They suppose that the poor region pays a small salary. Di⁄er-
ences in wages introduce a competitiveness e⁄ect which promotes dispersion
of economic activities and may eventually more than counterbalance the ten-
dency to agglomeration of the home market e⁄ect. In Ottaviano and Thisse,
heterogeneous preferences on the attachment to the local region generates
di⁄erences in salaries of the type assumed by Madariaga et al, since agglom-
eration forces move to the rich region those workers that are less attached
to their own region, implying that the remaining workers would receive a
small salary, the di⁄erence in wages being related to the di⁄erence in local
attachments between those emigrating and those remaining.
As stressed by Cristina Terra in her comments to Ottaviano and Thisse￿ s
paper, economic geography is a good instrument to analyze regional economic
integration. It should help to understand the location decisions of ￿rms,
highly related to foreign direct investments, as well as the bene￿ts associated
to economies of scale when goods, capital and labor are allowed to move
freely across national borders. In particular, it should help to understand
the factors promoting agglomeration and dispersion of economic activities,
and how to correct them in order to promote an equilibrate and e¢ cient
assignment of resources across countries and regions. For example, the design
of redistributive policies, as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, may be
evaluated from this perspective.
This is a promising research area, which would help policymakers to de-
sign good policies addressed to correct the undesirable side e⁄ects of ag-
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As stated in the previous section, the theoretical starting point of Madariaga
et al (2003) is the bell-shaped relationship between transportation costs and
agglomeration of economic activities, in a two country economy ￿ one poorer
than the other. On the empirical side of the paper, they build di⁄erent
measures of agglomeration of economic activities across regions in NAFTA
and Mercosur separately, with the objective of measuring the e⁄ect of regional
integration on agglomeration and economic convergence.
Madariaga et al (2003) measure the trends in agglomeration of economic
activities across regions using di⁄erent concentration measures. In a sec-
ond step, they use these concentration measures in otherwise standard con-
vergence regressions. Using a Gini index on three di⁄erent variables (land
area, population and sectorial activity) they ￿nd some evidence on diver-
gence across regions in NAFTA and agglomeration in Mercosur ￿ even if the
process in Mercosur slowdown after 1991. By including the obtained agglom-
eration measures in otherwise standard convergence regressions, the authors
claim that there is a positive relation between the growth rate and the den-
sity of economic activities. Finally, they conclude from these regressions that
￿NAFTA did not play a signi￿cant role in the convergence process between
Mexico and the US,￿at the time they observe convergence across countries
in the Mercosur over the period 1985-2000, with an acceleration after 1994.
As pointed out by Eduardo Loyo and Gabriel Felbermayr in their com-
ments, the theoretical model in Madariaga et al sheds light on agglomeration
and dispersion of economic activities between a poor and a rich country.
However, the empirical part of the paper focuses on agglomeration across re-
gions within a RIA. Whether movements in regional agglomeration are due
to changes between country or changes within country is not analyzed, but
the proposed model only has predictions concerning the former. An inter-
esting theoretical extension would be a four location model (Northern and
Southern regions within both the North and South countries). From the
empirical side, it would be interesting to understand if agglomeration forces
move economic activities to the borders, as suggested by Hanson (1998).
5 Lessons for Latin American
The main challenge faced by Latin American countries is to ￿nd a growth
strategy, in the sense of Rodrik, allowing them to converge to the living
standards in advanced countries. Paradoxically, during the last two decades
LA has introduced substantial orthodox reforms, but they have not delivered
17
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The main question we would like to answer in the framework of the Euro-
Latin Network is whether regional integration would be a growth strategy
for LA. In particular, we would like to see if something can be learned from
the European integration process. Of course, we must take into account that
￿Institutional innovations don￿ t travel well,￿as claimed by Rodrik.
In a recent paper, Venables and Winters (2003) draw out some lessons
from European integration experience for the FTAA. On the economic side,
they claim that even if the Americas o⁄er a greater potential for trade cre-
ation and economic development, they may su⁄er greater economic diver-
gence due to its initial large di⁄erences in economic levels. On the political
side, they claim that integration requires a deep political commitment and
the existence of institutions aimed to promote and protect integration from
the inevitable frictions with national goals. This role is being played in Eu-
rope by the Franco-German axe and the Brussels institutions. They claim
that it is hard to see what their equivalents in the Americas might be.
In the same direction, Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) analyzes
whether it makes sense for Mercosur to create a monetary union similar
to the EMU. They claim that from the point of view of the theory of optimal
currency areas, Mercosur is far from achieving the necessary pre-requisites for
a monetary union. In particular, trade ￿ ows within Mercosur countries are
relatively low, when compared to EMU members, partially due to the closed
nature of Mercosur economies. Moreover, countries endowments in Mercosur
are too similar to obtain much bene￿ts from trade, implying that Merco-
sur will have a limited e⁄ect on regional trade. Secondly, they stress that
an important lesson from EMU is that Germany has provided the necessary
credibility of monetary and ￿scal discipline. There is no such candidate for
Mercosur, implying that a monetary union should generate limited bene￿ts
in terms of credibility. A monetary union should include a country like the
US, but setting up a monetary block between the US and Latin American
countries does not seem to be very realistic.
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